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Abstract. Hippocampal cognitive map—a neuronal representation of the spatial
environment—is broadly discussed in the computational neuroscience literature for decades.
More recent studies point out that hippocampus plays a major role in producing yet another
cognitive framework that incorporates not only spatial, but also nonspatial memories—the
memory space. However, unlike cognitive maps, memory spaces have been barely studied
from a theoretical perspective. Here we propose an approach for modeling hippocampal
memory spaces as an epiphenomenon of neuronal spiking activity. First, we suggest that
the memory space may be viewed as a finite topological space—a hypothesis that allows
treating both spatial and nonspatial aspects of hippocampal function on equal footing. We
then model the topological properties of the memory space to demonstrate that this concept
naturally incorporates the notion of a cognitive map. Lastly, we suggest a formal descrip-
tion of the memory consolidation process and point out a connection between the proposed
model of the memory spaces to the so-called Morris’ schemas, which emerge as the most
compact representation of the memory structure.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
In the neurophysiological literature, the functions of mammalian hippocampus are usually dis-
cussed from the following two main perspectives. One group of studies addresses the role of the
hippocampus in representing the ambient space in a cognitive map [1, 2], and the other focuses
on its role in processing nonspatial memories, notably the episodic memory frameworks [3–6].
Active studies of the former began with the discovery of the “place cells”—hippocampal neurons
that fire action potentials in discrete regions of the environment—their respective “place fields”.
It was demonstrated, e.g., that place cell firing can be used to reconstruct the animal’s trajectory
on moment by moment basis [7–9], or to describe its past navigational experiences [10] and even
its future planned routs [11], which suggests that the cognitive map encoded by the hippocampal
network provides a foundation of the animal’s spatial memory and spatial awareness [12, 13].
On the other hand, it was observed that hippocampal lesions result in severe disparity in
episodic memory function, i.e., the ability to produce a specific memory episode and to place it into
a context of preceding and succeeding events. In healthy animals, episodic sequences consistently
interleave with one another, yielding an integrated, cohesive semantic structure [14–18]. In [21–
23] it was therefore suggested that the overall memory framework should be viewed as an abstract
“memory space”M, in which individual memories correspond to broadly understood “locations”
or “regions.” The relationships between memories are represented via spatial relationships be-
tween these regions, such as adjacency, overlap or containment (Fig. 1). It was also suggested that
the animals can “conceptually navigate” the memory space by perusing through learned associa-
tions, i.e., by comparing and contrasting directly connected memories and inferring relationships
between indirectly linked ones [19, 20]. In this approach, the conventional spatial inferences that
enable spatial navigation of physical environments based on cognitive maps are viewed as partic-
ular examples of a navigating a memory space, which in general allow inferring associations and
producing reasoning chains of abstract nature [21]. In other words, the concept of memory space
generalizes the notion of cognitive map: the latter unifies specifically spatial memories and hence
forms a substructure or a subspace embedded into a larger memory space.
Extended topological hypothesis. Traditionally, the cognitive map was viewed as a Cartesian
map of animal’s locations, distances to landmarks, angles between spatial cues and so forth [12,
13]. However, increasing amount of experimental evidence suggests that this map is based on
representing qualitative spatial relationships rather than precise spatial metrics. For example, it
has been demonstrated that if the environment gradually changes its shape in a way that preserves
relative order of spatial cues, then the temporal order of the place cell spiking and the relative
arrangement of the place fields remain invariant throughout the change [24–31]. This suggests that
place cell coactivities emphasize contiguities between locations as well as the temporal sequence
in which they are experienced, and hence that the hippocampus encodes a flexible framework of
spatial relationships—a topological map of space [17, 32–34].
The mathematical nature of memory space has not been addressed in computational neuro-
science literature. However, general properties of the episodic memory frameworks suggest that
such a space should also be viewed as primarily topological. Indeed, the “regions” or “locations”
inM are abstract concepts that are not attributed any particular geometric features, such as shape
or size, and the relationships between these regions do not involve precise metric calculations of
distances and angles. Rather, the memory space is based on qualitative spatiotemporal relation-
ships, which is a defining property of topological spaces [35]. Thus, the topological perspective
provides a common ground for both “spatial” and “non-spatial” aspects of the hippocampal func-
tions. In fact, the contraposition between these two specialties of the hippocampus might have
3FIG. 1: A schematic illustration of memory space concept. (A) Memory elements are viewed as regions in memory
space, r1 and r2 (red and blue ovals). The overlapping regions yield a smaller region in the intersection that represents
a shared memory (top figure). Alternatively, one memory region can also contain another (the middle figure), or two
memory regions can be separate from one another (bottom figure). (B). Memory elements jointly form a cohesive
framework—the memory space—into which different memory sequences are embedded. The episodes connected in
sequences can be viewed as chains of interconnected regions that run across the memory space, whereas memories
that are “broader in the features” are represented by extended, space-like domains of the memory space. The most
elementary, indecomposable elements shared between distinct behavioral episodes represent “nodes”—the elementary
locations in the memory space.
originated, in the first place, from an excessive “geometrization” of the cognitive map. If the
hippocampal spatial map is Cartesian, then it is not entirely clear which mechanism could be
responsible for representing coordinates, distances, angles, etc., in the spatial domain and only
qualitative relationships between memory items in the mnemonic domain. On the other hand, it
is hard to attribute geometric characteristics to the elements of the memory space, especially to
the nonspatial memories, and it is unclear what role geometry would play in that space. However,
if both the cognitive map and the memory space are viewed as topological, based on relational
representation of information, then the principles of spatial representation and mnemonic memory
functions converge [34]. Taken together, these arguments suggest that the hippocampal network
encodes a generic topological framework, which may be manifested as a cognitive map or as a
more general memory space, depending on the context and the nature of the encoded information.
In the following, we propose a theoretical framework that incorporates both the cognitive maps
and the memory spaces in a single model and allows interpreting hippocampal memory spaces as
epiphenomena of neuronal activity. In particular, it allows relating the topological properties of
the memory space to the parameters of the place cell spiking, e.g., spiking rate, spatial selectivity
of firing, etc., and connecting the concept of memory space to the Morris’ memory schemas.
II. THE MODEL
In [36] we proposed theoretical approach for modeling cognitive maps, which allows com-
bining the information provided by the individual place cells into a large-scale topological rep-
resentation of the environment. Following the standard neurophysiological paradigm, the model
assumes, firstly, that the activity of each individual place cell ck encodes a spatial region rk that
serves as a building block of the cognitive map. Secondly, it assumes that the large-scale structure
of the cognitive map emerges from the connections between these regions, encoded in a population
place cell assemblies—functionally interconnected groups that synaptically drive their respective
4FIG. 2: Coactivity complex and the cell assembly complex.: (A). Three exemplary simplexes: a one-dimensional
(1D) link, a 2D triangle and a 3D tetrahedron are shown on the top. Together a few simplexes form a small simplicial
complex Σ shown below. Note that the 2D and 3D simplexes surrounding a 1D simplex (the blue link) form its
vicinity–this observation will be used in the Alexandrov space construction. (B). The nerve complexN represents the
pattern of overlaps between place fields covering a given environment, every simplex σ ∈ N represents a combination
σ = [pii0 , pii1 , ..., piid ] of overlapping place fields, pii∩pii...∩pid , ∅. The bottom of the panel shows place field map, M(E)
of a square environment with six holes, E6h, traversed by a trajectory γ (black line). Place cells are shown as vertices
of the simplexes: the active place cells are shown as red points and the inactive ones as black points. The figure
schematically represents a 2D-skeleton of T , used to compute the topological features of the underlying environment.
The simplexes representing place cell combinations that become coactive as the animal navigates along γ form a
simplicial path Γ, shown in red. The simplicial path encircles the hole in the coactivity complex that represents the
physical hole in the environment. The coactivity complex T is an implementation of the nerve complex in temporal
domain: every simplex, σ ∈ T represents a combination of coactive place cells, σ = [c1, c2, ..., cn]. Over time, T
becomes structurally identical to N . (C). Simplexes of the cell assembly complex TCA represent the cell assemblies,
shown as interconnected cliques of vertexes—that jointly drive readout neurons in the downstream networks (shown
as pentagons to which place cells connect synaptically). Red clique represents an ignited place cell assembly, eliciting
a spiking response from its readout neuron.
reader-classifier (readout) neurons in the downstream networks [37, 38]. A particular readout neu-
ron integrates the presynaptic inputs and produces a series of spikes, thus actualizing a specific
relationship ρ(r1, r2, ..., rm) between the regions r1, r1,... rm.
A few schematic models were built in [36, 40–44] based on the observation that an as-
sembly of place cells c1, c2, ..., cm, can be schematically represented by an “abstract simplex,”
σ = [c1, c2, ..., cm]. In mathematics, the term “simplex” usually designates a convex hull of (d + 1)
points in a space of at least d dimensions. For example, a first order simplex can be visualized as
a zero dimensional point, a second order simplex—as a line segment with a vertex at each end,
a third order simplex—as a triangle with three vertices, etc. (Fig. 2A). However, in topological
applications that address net properties of combinations of simplexes—simplicial complexes—
the shapes of the simplexes play no role: the information is contained only in the combinatorics
of the vertexes shared by the adjacent simplexes. This motivates using the so-called “abstract
simplexes”—combinatorial abstractions, defined without any reference to geometry, simply as
sets of (d + 1) elements of arbitrary nature. Thus, abstract simplexes and simplicial complexes
retain only one basic property of their geometric counterparts: just as the triangles of the tetrahe-
dra include their facets, an abstract simplex of order (d + 1) includes all its subsimplexes of lower
orders. As a consequence, a nonempty overlap of a pair of simplexes σ and σ′ is a subsimplex of
5both σ and σ′ (Fig. 2A).
Previous studies [40–46] suggest that the topological theory of simplicial complexes provides
a remarkably efficient semantics for describing many familiar concepts and phenomena of hip-
pocampal physiology, as outlined in the following examples.
Example 1. A nerve complex N . The group of overlapping place fields, pii0 ∩ pii1 ∩ ... ∩
piid , ∅ produced by the place cells ci0 , ci1 , ...cid can be represented by an abstract simplex
σ = [pii0 , pii1 , ..., piid ]; the set of all simplexes produced for a place field map ME thus forms a
simplicial complex—the nerve of the cover N(ME) [40, 45, 46]. Every individual place field then
corresponds to a vertex, σi, of N(ME); each nonempty overlap of two place fields, pii ∩ pi j , ∅,
contributes a link σi j ∈ N(ME), a nonempty overlap of three place fields, pii ∩ pii ∩ pik , ∅, con-
tributes a facet σi jk ∈ N(ME), and so forth. The Alexandrov-Cˇech theorem [50, 52] states that
if the overlapping regions are contractible in E (i.e., can be continuously retracted into a point),
then N(ME) and E have the same number of holes, loops and handles in different dimensions—
mathematically, they have the same homologies, H∗(N(ME)) = H∗(E). Thus, the nerve complex
may serve as a schematic representation of the topological information contained in the place field
map ME [36].
Example 2. The coactivity complex T . In the brain, the information is represented via tem-
poral relationships between spike trains, rather than artificial geometric constructs such as place
fields. However, the place cell spiking patterns can also be described in terms of a simplicial “coac-
tivity” complex T (ME), which may be viewed as an implementation of the nerve complexN(ME)
in the temporal domain. In this construction, every active place cell ci is represented by a vertex,
σi, of T (ME); each coactive pair of cells, ci and c j, contributes a link σi j = [ci, c j] ∈ T (ME), a
triplet of coactive cells contributes a facet σi jk = [ci, c j, ck] ∈ T (ME), and so forth. As a whole, the
coactivity complex T represents the entire pool of the coactive place cell combinations. Numeri-
cal simulations carried out in [40–42, 44] demonstrate that if the parameters of place cells’ spiking
fall into the biological range, then T (ME) faithfully represents the topology of two- and three-
dimensional environments and serves as a schematic representation of the information provided
by place cell coactivity (Fig. 2B).
Example 3. Cell assembly complex TCA. Physiologically, not all combinations of coactive
place cells are detected and processed by the downstream networks. Therefore, in order to describe
only the physiologically relevant coactivities, one can construct a smaller “cell assembly complex”
TCA(ME), whose maximal simplexes represent the combinations of cells that comprise the actual
cell assemblies (Fig. 2C). Such a complex plays two complementary roles: first, it schematically
represents the architecture of the cell assembly network (i.e., defines explicitly which cells group
into which assemblies) and second, it represents the information encoded by this network and
hence serves as a schematic model of the cognitive map [43].
Previous studies [40–42, 44] concentrated on the lower dimensions (D ≤ 3) of the coactivity
and of cell assembly complexes used to represent spatial information, whereas the higher dimen-
sions were not addressed or physiologically interpreted. However, a schematic representation of
both spatial and nonspatial memories should include the full scope of relationships encoded by
the cell assemblies; we will therefore use the full coactivity complex TCA(ME) to model a multidi-
mensional memory space.
A constructive approach to topology and continuity. We now make a short mathematical
digression to outline the key notions necessary for discussing the topology of memory spaces. In
general, defining a topological space requires two constituents: a set X of spatial primitives—the
“building blocks of space,” and a set of relationships between them, which define spatial order
and spatial connectivity. In the standard approach, the topological spaces are comprised of an in-
6finite amount of infinitesimal points, and a framework of proximity and remoteness relationships
emerges as a matter of combining these points into “topological neighborhoods” (see Section IV).
Such system of neighborhoods is referred to as a topology on X, which we will denote as Ω(X). In
order for the neighborhoods to be mutually consistent, it is required that their unions and finite in-
tersections should also be neighborhoods from Ω(X) (so-called Hausdorff axioms, see Section IV).
Once a consistent framework of neighborhoods is defined, the elements of the set X can be viewed
as “spatial locations” and the set X itself—as a topological space. For example, the environment E,
viewed as a domain of Euclidean space, contains a continuum of infinitesimal points with Carte-
sian coordinates (x, y). The standard selection of topological neighborhoods in this case is the set
of open balls of rational radii, centered at the rational points, and their combinations, which define
the Euclidean topology ΩE(E), used in calculus and in standard geometries [51].
Modeling a “memory space” requires modifying this approach in two major aspects. First,
since a memory space emerges from the spiking activity of a finite number of neurons, it must be
modeled as finite topological space [52–54], i.e., as a space that may contain only a finite number
of elementary locations. Second, since every location is encoded by a finite ensemble of place
cells, each one of which represents an extended region, the “spatial primitives” in memory space
must be finite domains, rather than infinitesimal points. The latter approach underlies the so-
called pointfree (or “pointless”) topologies, geometries [55–59] and mereotopologies [60, 61], in
which finite regions are considered as the primary objects, whereas the points appear as secondary
abstractions. As discussed below, these approaches provide suitable frameworks for modeling the
biological mechanisms of spatial information processing.
A simplicial schema of a memory space. To build a model of a memory space, we start by
noticing that simplicial complexes themselves may be viewed as topological spaces, because the
relationships between simplexes in a simplicial complex Σ naturally define a set of topological
proximity neighborhoods. Indeed, a neighborhood of a simplex σ is formed by a collection of
simplexes that include σ (Fig. 2A). It can be verified that the unions and the intersections of so-
defined neighborhoods satisfy the Hausdorff axioms and hence that any simplicial complex Σ may
be viewed as a finitary topological space A(Σ) (see Section IV). In mathematical literature, such
spaces are referred to as Alexandrov spaces, after their discoverer, P. S. Alexandrov [52], which
motivates our notation.
Importantly, the construction of Alexandrov spaces applies to “abstract” simplicial complexes,
whose simplexes may represent collections of elements of arbitrary nature and hence possess a
great contextual flexibility. In our model, individual simplexes represent combinations of coac-
tive place cells, believed to encode memory episodes. We may therefore view the pool of coac-
tive neuronal combinations as a topological space from two perspectives. On the one hand, one
can consider a formal “space of coactivities” AE(TCA) defined, as the corresponding coactivity
complexes, in terms of the neuronal spiking parameters. On the other hand, assuming that the
combinatorial relationships between groups of coactive cells capture relationships between the
corresponding memory episodes, one may view the collection of memories represented by these
neuronal activity patterns as elements of a topological memory spaceME(TCA). In other words,
one can view the Alexandrov space AE(TCA) as a model of the memory spaceME(TCA) induced
by the corresponding cell assembly network. In particular, such model can be used to connect the
physiological parameters of the latter and the topological characteristics ofME(TCA), as we dis-
cuss below. Since all subsequent analyses are carried out only for the memory spaces induced from
cell assembly complexes, we will suppress the reference to TCA in the memory space notation.
We would like to note here, that since the simplexes are not structureless objects (i.e., one
combination of coactive cells represented by simplex σ1 may overlap with another combination,
7represented by a simplex σ2, yielding a third combination/simplex σ3), they represent extended
regions, rather than structureless points. As a result, the memory spaceME naturally emerges as
a region-based, or “pointfree” space, in which individual memory episodes correspond to finite
regions. Nevertheless, one can easily construct a conventional, i.e., point-based, topological space
in which a finite set of elementary locations—the “points”—is organized into the same system
of proximity neighborhoods as its region-based counterpart (see Section IV). In this construction,
the “elementary locations” are simply the smallest regions of ME, i.e., the ones that cannot be
further subdivided using the information contained in the place cell coactivity—the “nodes of the
memory space,” in terminology of [21]. In the spatial context, they correspond to the atomic,
indecomposable regions. For example, in a mini-memory space encoded by two place cells may
contain a few “atomic” regions: e.g., the region marked by the activity of first, but not the second
cell, the region marked by the coactivity of both cells and the region marked by the activity of the
second, but not the first cell (Fig. 1A and Figure 12.1 in [62]). In the following we will discuss the
organization of such regions in order to establish important properties of the memory spaces, e.g.
a continuous mapping of the environment E into a memory spaceME.
III. RESULTS
Continuity in memory space. The discrete memories that comprise a memory space may be
triggered by constellations of cues and/or actions, that drive the activity of a particular population
of cell assemblies [63]. Activation of one cell assembly may excite adjacent cell assemblies that
represent overlapping memory elements. Thus, as the animal navigates the environment, the cell
assemblies ignited along a path γ form an “activity packet” that moves across the network [64–66].
If the cell assembly network is represented by a complex TCA, this packet is represented by a group
of “active” simplexes that moves across TCA, tracing a simplicial path Γ (Fig. 2B). As discussed in
[39–42, 44], the structure of the simplicial paths captures the shape of the corresponding physical
paths and hence represents the connectivity of the environment. For example, a contractible sim-
plicial path corresponds to a contractible physical rout, whereas a non-contractible simplicial path
marks a non-traversable domain occupied by an obstacle, e.g., by a physical obstruction or by a
predator (Fig. 2B,C).
Intuitively, one would expect that a continuous physical trajectory should be represented by a
“continuous succession” of activity regimes of the place cells that represents a continuous suc-
cession of memory episodes. Indeed, the topological structure of the memory space provides a
concrete meaning for this intuition. It can be shown that the environment E maps continuously
into the memory space ME, and in particular, that each continuous trajectory γ traced by the
animal in the physical environment maps into a continuous path ℘ in the memory spaceME (see
Section IV). It should be noted however, that these are different continuities: the physical trajectory
γ is continuous in the Euclidean topology of the environment, whereas the path ℘ is continuous in
the topology of the memory space. This distinction is due to fact that the environment E and the
memory spacesME are not topologically equivalent to each other: one can map the rich Euclidean
topology onto the discrete finite topology of a memory space, but not vice versa. In other words,
despite the continuity of mapping from E intoME, the memory space remains only a discretiza-
tion of the environment, which nevertheless serves as a topological representation of E and can be
continuously navigated.
Topological properties of memory spaces can be studied from two perspectives: from the per-
spective of algebraic topology that captures the large-scale structure ofME in terms of topological
invariants [62], or from the perspective of the so-called general topology [51], which describes the
8FIG. 3: Place field maps in three simulated environments. (A.) An example of a place field map simulated
in a 1m × 1m environment with one hole in the middle, E1h, that was previously studied in [40, 42, 43]. Dots of
different colors represent spikes produced by different place cells. Clusters of dots represent the corresponding place
fields. (B). A place field map simulated in 2m × 2m environment with two holes, E2h, studied in [41]. (C.) The
third environment E6h (1.6m × 1.6m in size) is similar to the behavioral arena studied in [79], where the concept of
the Morris’ schemas was introduced. Ten different place field maps were simulated in each environment and used to
produce a cell assembly network, as described in [43]. The mean size of the place fields (20 cm) and the mean firing
rate of the place cells (14 Hz) is the same in all cases.
topological “fabric” ofME, in terms of the proximity neighborhoods.
The algebraic-topological properties of the coactivity complexes were studied in [40, 43, 47,
48]. There it was demonstrated that if place cell populations operate within biological parameters,
then the number of topological loops in different dimensions of the coactivity complex—the Betti
numbers bn(TCA) [62]—match the Betti numbers of the environment bn(E). Moreover, the correct
shape of the coactivity complex emerges within a biologically plausible period that was referred to
as learning time, Tmin. These results apply directly to the memory spaces, since the Betti numbers
of a memory spaceME are identical to those of the coactivity complex TCA that produced it [52].
(For a mathematically oriented reader, we mention that the homological structure of ME should
be defined in terms of singular homologies, whereas the structure of the coactivity complex is
described in terms of simplicial homologies. However, for the cases considered below, these
homologies coincide, so we omit the discussion of the differences [54]). This implies, in particular,
that the memory space that correctly represents the topology of the environment emerges together
with the corresponding coactivity complex during the same learning time Tmin, for the same set of
spiking parameters (in terminology of [40], within the “learning region,” L).
Importantly, the learning times and other global characteristics of TCA produced via algebraic
topology techniques are insensitive to many details of the place cell spiking activity [40, 43, 47,
48]. For example, the learning time Tmin depends mostly on the mean place field sizes and the
mean peak firing rates, but it does not depend strongly on the spatial layout of the place fields or
on the limited spiking variations. The question arises, how sensitive is the “fabric” of the memory
space to the parameters of neuronal activity?
To address this question we simulated ten different place field maps Mi, i = 1, ..., 10, in three
environments (Fig. 3), and verified that the corresponding nerves NE(Mi), coactivity complexes
T (Mi) and cell assembly complexes TCA(Mi) produced the required large-scale topological char-
9acteristics (i.e., the same Betti numbers: b0(E1h) = b0(E2h) =0 (E6h) = 1, b1(E1h) = 1, b1(E2h) = 2,
b0(E6h) = 6, and bn(E1h) = bn(E2h) = bn(E6h) = 0, n ≥ 2). We then built and analyzed the
memory spaces for the cell assembly complexes, and analyzed their general-topological structure.
Mathematically, the discrete topology of an Alexandrov space can be represented by a numerical
matrix—the Stong matrix SA, which enables effective numerical analyses (see Section IV and
[53]). Analyzing the Stong matrices for M1h, M2h and M6h, we observed the memory spaces
constructed for different place field maps in the same environment have different topologies. In
other words, a memory spaceME(Mi) encoded by a cell assembly network that corresponds to the
place field map Mi cannot, in general, be continuously deformed into the memory spaceME(M j),
that corresponds to place field map M j in the same environment. From the mathematical perspec-
tive, this outcome is not surprising: since memory spaces are topologically inequivalent to the
environment (a continuous mapping E → M exists but the continuous mapping M → E does
not), two different memory spaces produced in the same environment may be inequivalent to each
other. However, from a neurophysiological perspective, these results imply that a memory space
reflects not only the large-scale topological structure of the environment, but also the specifics of
a particular place field map, e.g., local spatial relationships between individual place fields.
Further analyses point out that even if the place field map is geometrically the same but the
firing rates change by less than 5%, the cell assembly networks built according to the methods
outlined in [43] also change. As a result, the corresponding memory spaces come out to be topo-
logically distinct from one another, although the differences between their respective Stong ma-
trices are smaller than the differences between the Stong matrices induced by the different maps
place field maps (Fig. 4).
These results can be physiologically interpreted in the context of the so-called place field
remapping phenomena, which we briefly outline as follows. As mentioned in the Introduction,
if the changes in the environment are gradual, then the relative order of the place fields in space re-
mains the same and place cells exhibit only small changes in the frequency of spiking [67, 68]. In
contrast, if an environment is changed abruptly, e.g., if major cues suddenly appear or disappear,
then the place cells may independently shift the locations of their place fields across the entire
environment and significantly change their firing rates, i.e., one place field map is substituted by
another [69–71]. The former phenomenon, known as rate remapping, is believed to represent
variations of contextual experiences embedded into a stable spatial code, while latter, the global
remapping, is believed to indicate a restructuring of cognitive representation of the environment.
This is confirmed by our model: the differences between the memory spaces produced by two
geometrically distinct place field maps Mi and M j (physiologically, one can view a place field map
M j as a result of a remapping from a map Mi) are large, whereas rate remapping produces much
smaller variations in the structure of the memory space (Fig. 4). In either case, the corresponding
memory spaces are continuous images of the environment (i.e., a continuous mapping E → ME
exists in all cases) andME can be continuously navigated, see Suppl. Movies [89–91]. In particu-
larME always correctly represents the large-scale topology of the environment (the Betti numbers
bn(E) and bn(ME) match for all ns).
Reduction of the memory spaces. Over time, the memory frameworks undergo complex
changes: detailed spatial memories initially acquired by the hippocampus become coarser-grained
as they consolidate into long-term memories stored in the cortex [72–75]. From the memory
space’s properties perspective, this suggests that a memory space associated with a particular
memory framework (e.g., with a particular environment) looses granularity but preserves its over-
all topological structure. The physiological mechanisms underlying these processes and the the-
oretical principles of memory consolidation are currently poorly understood and remain a matter
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FIG. 4: Similarity between memory spaces and place field remapping. (A) Proportion of one-dimensional sim-
plexes (links) shared by ten pairs of coactivity complexes, TCA(Mi) and TCA(M j), induced from ten pairs of place
field maps in the six-hole environment E6h. Left panel illustrates the case in which the centers of the place fields in
Mi and M j are independently scattered (global remapping); right panel illustrates the case in which the place field
positions are fixed, but the place cells’ firing rates and place field sizes are altered by 5% (rate remapping). In the
latter case, most links are preserved, implying that the one-dimensional “skeleton” of the coactivity complex [62] (or
the corresponding coactivity graph G [36]) is largely preserved in rate remappings. (B) The distance norms between
the Stong matrices in both global (blue) and rate (red) remappings are significant, implying that the corresponding
memory spacesM6h(Mi) andM6h(M j) are topologically distinct (see Methods). However, the change of the memory
space’s topology in rate remapping is smaller than in global remapping.
of debate [76, 77]. However, the topological framework proposed above allows an impartial,
schematic description of consolidating the topological details in memory spaces and producing a
more compact representations of the original memory framework.
As mentioned in the Section II, topological neighborhoods define proximity and remoteness
between spatial locations. However, certain neighborhoods may carry only limited topological
information. For example, if a neighborhood Ui in a spaceA is entirely contained in a single larger
neighborhood Uk and is involved in the same relationships with other neighborhoods as Uk, then it
only adds granularity to the topology ofA without affecting its overall structure (Fig. 5A). In such
case, the topology Ω(A) can be coarsened by removing Ui and producing a “reduced” space A′
that is topologically similar to A (homotopically equivalent, see Section IV and [53, 54, 78]). If
such coarsening procedure is applied multiple times, then the resulting chain of transformations,
A → A′ → A′′ → ... → A(n), generates a sequence of progressively coarser and coarser spaces
that retain the homological identity ofA (e.g., same Betti numbers).
To the extent to which the consolidated memory frameworks retain the structure of the memory
spaceME, they can be interpreted as its topological reductions. Thus, in the proposed approach,
the consolidation process may be modeled via a sequence of less granular and more compact
memory spaces,ME →M′E →M′′E → ...→M(n)E as discussed in [53, 54, 78], see Fig. 6A-C and
Suppl. Movies [92]).
Importantly, the reduced memory spaces M(k)E remain continuous images of both the original
memory spaceME and of the environment E. However, unlike the full memory space, the reduced
memory spaces are not just “topological replicas” of the cell assembly complex: as the memory
space is reduced, the direct correspondence between the simplexes of TCA and the elements of
M(k>0)E disappears. The reduction of neighborhoods and points inM(k>0)E corresponds to eliminat-
ing certain simplexes of the cell assembly complex TCA, i.e., to a restriction of the processed place
11
FIG. 5: Reduction of finite topological spaces. (A) A finite topological space containing seven points, with the
topological neighborhoods shown by the ovals. Note, that the blue and the yellow point on the first panel are separated
by a single neighborhood. If this neighborhood is removed (middle panel), then the yellow point collapses onto the
blue point. The resulting green point represents a single “combined” location. The minimal possible topological
construction with circular topology contains four points. (B) The reduction of the number of points in three memory
spaces,M1h(M),M2h(M) andM6h(M), in the three environments shown on Fig. 3, as a function of the reduction step.
As the topology is consolidated, the number of simplexes–and of the corresponding points–drops from thousands to
a few dozens (see Fig. 4). Note that the dimensionality of the original simplexes ranges between D = 7 for T1h and
D = 9 for T6h, whereas most elements in the reduced spaces have dimensionality D ≈ 3. Thus, the higher order
memory combinations are consolidated into smaller-dimensional framework.
cell coactivity inputs. The connections required to process these inputs can form a smaller cell
assembly network that encodes the consolidated memory spaceM(k)E .
The smallest memory space obtained at the last step of the reduction processM(max)E (i.e., the
one that cannot be reduced any further), retains the overall topological properties of the original
memory space in the most compact form, i.e., using the smallest number of points and neigh-
borhoods obtainable via a particular consolidation process (Fig. 6C). The exact structure of such
an “irreducible” memory space, referred to as core C(ME) of the memory space ME, depends
on the reduction sequence ([53, 54, 78] and Suppl. Fig. 1). However, for every environment E,
considered as topological space, there exists a unique core CE (see Fig. 6D and [53, 78]), which
schematically represents its basic, skeletal structure, approximated by C(ME).
Similar compact, schematic representations of the memory structures are frequently discussed
in neurophysiological literature. For example, in [79] it was proposed that, as a result of learning,
animals may acquire a cognitive schema—a consolidated representation of the spatial structure of
the environmental and of the behavioral task [80, 81]. Specifically, in the case of the environment
E6h shown on Fig. 3C, the Morris’ schema has the form shown on the bottom panel of Fig. 6D,
i.e., it is structurally identical to the core of E6h. We use this observation to suggest that the
Morris’ schemas may in general be identified with the cores of the memory spaces produced by
a particular cell assembly network in a given environment, and that acquiring a Morris’ schema
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FIG. 6: Reduction of the Alexandrov spaces into their cores and the corresponding Morris’ schemas.. (A)
Points of the memory space, induced from a cell assembly coactivity complex, constructed for the place field maps
shown on Fig. 3. The color of points corresponds to the dimensionality of the corresponding simplexes. (B). The
points of the memory spaces after 10 reduction steps (left column) and (C) the points of the topological cores of
the memory spaces, obtained after a maximal reduction of the memory spaces (right column). For more examples
see Suppl. Fig. 1. (D). The minimal cores that correspond to each environment. A four point core on the top panel
provides a minimal topological representation of a circle, the two linked four point circles represent the environment
with two holes (middle panel). In the case of the environment considered in the experiment discussed in [79], Fig. 3D,
the minimal core corresponds to the Morris’ schema.
through a memory consolidation process may be modeled as the memory space reduction.
Under such hypothesis, the model allows computing specific Morris’ schemas from their re-
spective memory spaces, using the physiological parameters of neuronal activity and the corre-
sponding cell assembly network architecture. Specifically, one can identify the number of ele-
ments in a given schema, their projected locations in the environment and their shapes. For the
memory spaces constructed for different place field maps of the environments shown on Fig. 3, the
computed Morris schemas form a set of connected loops encircling the topological obstacles, as
suggested in [80, 81]. The density of the nodes along the constructed Morris’ schemas (Fig. 6C) is
higher than in heuristic constructions, and similar to the characteristic distance between the place
field centers in the corresponding maps.
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IV. DISCUSSION
According to the cognitive map concept, spatial cognition is based on internalized representa-
tion of space encoded by the hippocampal network [1], which was broadly studied both experi-
mentally and theoretically, in particular, using the topological approach [40, 43, 45, 46]. Here we
extend the topological schema approach proposed in [36], to describe not only spatial, but also
nonspatial memories in a single mathematical construct—a topological space with specific math-
ematical properties, induced by the physiological parameters of neuronal activity. The resulting
model allows demonstrating, first, that the memory spaces incorporate representations of spatial
experiences, i.e., that the cognitive maps are naturally embedded into memory spaces. In particu-
lar, the latter captures the topological structure of the navigated environment, so that the physical
trajectories are represented by continuous paths in the memory space. Second, the model allows
interpreting the hippocampal remapping phenomena in the context of the net topological proper-
ties of the memory spaces, both from the algebraic and from the general topological perspectives.
Lastly, it connects the memory space structure to the Morris’ schemas, by providing a schematic
representation for the memory consolidation process.
Memory spaces in other topological schemas. Simplicial coactivity complexes, e.g., the
ones discussed in the Examples 2 and 3 of Section II, are used to represent spatial information
by a population of readout neurons responding to nearly simultaneous activity of the presynaptic
place cells [36]. However, the construction of the memory space discussed above is by no means
limited to the particular syntax of processing the spiking outputs of the place cells. The key
property of a simplicial complex that turns it into a space is the partial ordering of its simplexes,
produced by the containment relationship: σ1 is “smaller” than σ2, if σ2 contains σ1 (i.e., σ1 < σ2
if σ2 ∩ σ1 = σ1). However, all topological schemas discussed in [36] define partial orders, and
without going into mathematical details, we point out that all partially ordered sets—posets—can
be viewed as a topological spaces, regardless of the nature of the order relationships [35, 83].
Thus, each topological schema S defines a specific finitary topological space,MS, which can be
interpreted as the memory space encoded by the cell assembly network that S represents. For
example, a mereological schema F , based on the cover relation, defines partial order “covered
region x is smaller than the covering region,” (x < y iff x J y). The RCC5 schema R5, based
on five topological relations (partial overlap PO, proper part PP, its inverse PPi, discrete DR and
equal EQ, see Fig. 1A and [84, 85]) is also partially ordered. In this case, a region x is smaller than
y if x is a proper part of y, or, if two regions x and y partially overlap, PO(x, y), then they share a
smaller region z that is a proper part of both x and y, i.e., PP(z, x), PP(z, y) [86]. The discrete (DR)
or equal (EQ) regions are unrelated. The posets PF and PR corresponding to these schemas define
their respective finitary topological spacesMF andMR that represent the topology environment
just as the simplicial schemaMT discussed above.
Given the same physiological parameters (e.g., the same number of place cells) the memory
spaces produced by different schemas may differ from one another, e.g. some of them may have
stronger topologies than others. However, all memory spaces may be regarded as finitary topo-
logical spaces that can be considered on the same footing, irrespective of the specific set of rules
according to which the information provided by individual place cells is combined in S. Thus,
the proposed model of memory spaces allows relating the capacity of different cell assembly net-
works, which may potentially implement different computational principles for processing spatial
information, to represent information.
Intrinsic representation of space. Current understanding of hippocampal neurophysiology
rests on the assumption that place cells’ spiking “tags” cognitive regions. Such approach allows
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describing the information contained in the spike trains phenomenologically, without addressing
the “hard problem” of how the brain can intrinsically interpret spiking activity as “spatial” [87].
It therefore remains unclear in what sense the spiking activity may actually produce a “cognitive
region,” in what sense two such regions may “overlap” or “contain one another,” and so forth. Yet,
in neuroscience literature it is recognized that “allocentric space is constructed in the brain rather
than perceived, and the hippocampus is central to this construction” [12, 88]. Paraphrasing L.
Nadel and H. Eichenbaum [88], it remains unclear how can “spaceless” data enter the hippocampal
system and spatial cognitive maps come out. In this connection, we would like to point out that
the topological approach discussed above may shed light on this problem, by allowing to interpret
spatiality in purely relational terms, as a construct emerging from the relationships between the
signals, implemented by neuronal networks with specific architecture.
Mathematical and Computational Methods
Establishing a topological correspondence between the environment and the memory space
requires a few definitions.
1. A topology on a space X is established by a system Ω(X) of topological neighborhoods,
which obey the Hausdorff axioms: any unions and finite overlaps of the topological neighborhoods
Ui ∈ Ω(X) produce another neighborhood from the same system Ω(X) (Fig. 7). The empty set and
the full set X also belong to Ω(X) [51].
2. A topology base B = Bi consists of a smaller set of “base” neighborhoods that can be
combined to produce any other neighborhood Ui of Ω. A key property of a topology base is that
it is closed under the overlap operation: an intersection of any two base neighborhoods yield (or,
more generally, contain) another base neighborhood. A topology base generates a unique topology
for which it forms a base, and hence it is a convenient tool for studying topological spaces (a rough
analogy is a set of basis vectors in a linear space, [51]).
Example 1: Euclidean plane. The standard choice of a topological base BE of a Euclidean
domain E are the open balls of rational radii, centered at the points with rational coordinates.
Every nonempty overlap of a finite collection of such balls contains a ball with a smaller radius.
The full set of the topological neighborhoods in the resulting topology is given by the arbitrary
unions of these balls [51].
Example 2: Cover induced topologies. One can generate an alternative topology for the Eu-
clidean domain E by covering it by a set of regions Ui and by augmenting this set with the regions
obtained by all possible intersections Ui∩U j∩ ...∩Uk. By construction, the resulting system of re-
gions will be closed under the overlap operation and hence define a topology base BU . To obtain a
topological base that is as rich as the Euclidean base BE(E), the collection of cover regions should
be sufficiently large (certainly infinite). However, one can generate much more modest bases and
topologies using finite covers. In particular, one can construct a topology of the environment
starting from the place fields covering the environment E,
E = ∪Ncc=1pic (1)
and build a discrete approximation to the Euclidean topology base from the place field domains
and their intersection closure (Fig. 3 and Fig. 8).
Example 3: Alexandrov topology on a simplicial complex. In a simplicial complex Σ, a neigh-
borhood Uσ of a simplex σ is formed by the set of simplexes σm, m = 1, ..., nσ, that include σ
(Fig. 2A). It can be verified directly that the unions and the intersections of so-defined neighbor-
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hoods produce another neighborhood from Ω(A(Σ)), in accordance with the Hausdorff axioms
[52].
FIG. 7: Basic notions of point set topology. (A). A set X with no spatial structure turns into a topological space as its
elements are combined into topological neighborhoods. For example, a subcollection of elements of X (marked by red
circles) may be selected to form the neighborhood “red” points, Ur. Another collection of elements (blue circles) may
form another, “blue” neighborhood Ub that may overlap with the red neighborhood Ur, yet another set may form the
green neighborhood Ug and so forth. (B). Eventually, the elements of X are grouped into a system of neighborhoods—
in this case, seven neighborhoods. (C). All intersections between these neighborhoods define a topological base B—a
set of basic neighborhoods whose combinations yield arbitrary neighborhoods on X. (D). The topology base defines
the “resolution” of the corresponding topology: if two points share an identical system of neighborhoods, then they
cannot be separated from each other, or “resolved” by the corresponding topology. The spaces in which for every
two points x and y there is a neighborhood that contains one point but not the other are referred to as T0 spaces. In
particular, all Alexandrov spaces are T0-separable. In the illustrated example, the topology base can “resolve” only 20
points, whereas all other elements of X fuse into these representative “locations.” (E). Adding the unions (only some
unions are illustrated by black dashed lines) produces the full system of neighborhoods, a finitary topology Ω(X).
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The overlap of all the neighborhoods containing a given simplexσ, Uσ = ∩mUσm , is its minimal
neighborhood. The minimal neighborhoods form a topology base in finitary space AΣ, which
defines the Alexandrov topology Ω(A(Σ)) (Fig. 8). In particular, the Alexandrov topology is
defined for all the examples discussed in Section 2: the nerve complex N , the temporal complex
T and the cell assembly complex TCA.
Continuous mappings between topological spaces. A space X maps continuously onto a
space Y , f : X → Y , if each topological neighborhood in Y is an f -image of a topological neigh-
borhood in X (for precise discussions see [62]). If two spaces X and Y map continuously onto
each other, then they are topologically equivalent. An example of topological equivalence is a
continuous deformation of X into Y (one can imagine the corresponding deformation of the neigh-
borhoods of X into the neighborhoods of Y that does not violate the mutual overlap, containment
and adjacency relationships between the neighborhoods). In contrast, if X cannot be transformed
into Y without adding or removing neighborhoods and points, then X and Y are topologically dis-
tinct. For example, if a space Y contains an extra hole, then the topology on Y lacks neighborhoods
that relate the “missing” points (contents of the hole) and points outside of the hole. For this rea-
son, a mismatch in the number of holes, handles, connectivity components and similar qualitative
features serves as immediate indicators of topological inequivalence of spaces.
It is important to notice, that if the space X has a richer topology (i.e., a larger set of topological
neighborhoods) than Y , then a continuous mapping f : X → Y may exist, but an inverse mapping,
g : Y → X, will not. For example, the rich Euclidean topology of the environment E can map
continuously into the finitary topology of the memory spaceM, because many neighborhoods of
E may map into a single neighborhood ofM. The converse is not true: no mapping can reproduce
the infinity of open sets in E from finite set of neighborhoods inM.
A continuous mapping of the environment into the memory space can be constructed as
follows. Let us consider first the coactivity complex T and a spatial mapping, f : MT → E,
that ascribes the Cartesian (x, y) coordinates to the spikes according to the animal’s location at
the time of spiking [36] (Fig. 8G). This function maps the activity of an individual place cell into
its place field, f : ri → pii, and the firing pattern of a place cell combination σ into its simplex
field lσ—the domain where all the cells in σ are active, f : σ → lσ. Notice that simplex fields
exist for all (not only maximal) simplexes of T . Assuming that some combination of place cells
is active at every location of the environment (a physiologically justified assumption), implies that
the simplex fields form a cover of E,
E = ∪Nσσ=1lσ (2)
Since simplexes of T may overlap with or include one another, the corresponding simplex fields
may also overlap. However, for every simplex σ there generically exists a subregion of its simplex
field—the atomic region aσ—where only this specific combination of cells is active. The name
“atomic” emphasizes that these regions cannot be subdivided any further based on the information
provided by place cell coactivity (a nonempty overlap of aσ with any other region yields aσ)
and that they are disjoint (aσ ∩ a′σ = ∅ for σ , σ′). As a result, they form a partition of the
environment—the atomic decomposition of the cover:
E = unionsqNσσ=1aσ (3)
which may be viewed as the ultimate discretization of space produced by the given place field
map.
17
FIG. 8: Discrete topological spaces and place field maps. (A) A schematic, mini-place field map that consists
of seven place fields (colored ovaloids), traversed by a fragment of the animal’s trajectory (dashed line). (B) The
corresponding nerve complex N7, which contains topological information about the environment. Its vertexes, σi,
correspond to the place fields, links σi j, to overlapping pairs, the triangles σi jk to simultaneously overlapping triples
of place fields. Alternatively, one can view this as the coactivity complex T7, whose vertexes correspond to active
place fields, links to pairs of coactive cells, triangles to coactive triples of cells, etc. (C) The partially ordered set–poset
P7 corresponding to the nerve N7. (D) The simplexes of the simplicial complex N7 (or the elements of the poset P7)
map into the atomic elements of the place field map. (E) The poset P7 can be viewed as a pointfree (relational) space
built from the regions defined by the place cell (co)activity. (F). The corresponding point-based Alexandrov space
should be viewed as an analogue of Fig. 1B. (G) A spatial mapping from the memory map to the environment and the
continuous mapping from the environment into memory space,MT .
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Since each atomic element corresponds to a particular simplex σ of T , it also defines a point
xσ of AT , and hence an element of the memory space MT . Consider now a reverse mapping,
F : E →MT , in which every point r = (x, y) of the environment contained in the atomic region aσ
maps into the corresponding point xσ ofMT . By construction, every base (minimal) neighborhood
in memory space Ω(MT ) is an image of a base neighborhood in the Euclidean topology of the
environment, Ω(E), and hence F is continuous map.
Continuity in memory space encoded by the cell assembly network. A similar argument
applies to the memory space generated by the cell assembly complex TCA. Similarly to the previ-
ous case, we assume that at least one cell assembly or its subassembly is active in every location
of the environment [43] and hence that the place cell (sub)assembly fields lσ form a cover
E = ∪Nσσ=1lσ (4)
The intersection closure of the cell assembly cover yields the decomposition of the environment
into the non-overlapping atomic regions ak, which form a partition of the environment,
E = unionsqNkk=1aσ (5)
Since every point of the environment belongs to one atomic region that corresponds to a particular
minimal neighborhood of the memory space, we have a continuous mapping from E to TCA and
henceME.
Alternatively, one can establish continuity of E to TCA by constructing a simplicial mapping
from the coactivity complex T to its subcomplex TCA, based on the observation that both com-
plexes are connected, have finite order, free fundamental groups and identical homologies [43].
Stong Matrix. The numerical analyses of the finite memory spaces were carried out in terms of
the Stong matrices. If a finite topological space X contains N minimal neighborhoods, U1, U2,...,
UN , then the topological structure on X is uniquely defined by a matrix Mi j, defined as following:
1. Mii = number of points that fall inside of the neighborhood Ui;
2. if Ui is the immediate neighborhood of U j, Mi j = 1 and M ji = −1;
3. Mi j = 0 otherwise;
Conversely, every integer matrix satisfying the requirements 1-3 describes a finite topological
spaceA [53].
For two finitary spaces A and B, topological equivalence follows from the equivalence of the
corresponding Stong matrices: A is equivalent to B, if the topology Ω(A) can be obtained from
Ω(B) by re-indexing the minimal neighborhoods. In other words, A and B are topologically
equivalent if the Stong matrix MA can be obtained from the Stong matrix MB by a permutation of
rows and columns, otherwise they are topologically distinct [53].
Reduction of a Stong matrix. If minimal neighborhood Ui is contained in a single immediate
neighborhood Uk, then it only adds granularity to the Alexandrov space A. Tbe latter can then
be coarsened by removing Ui. If, as a result of coarsening, the neighborhoods separating two
points p1 and p2 disappear, then they fuse into a single point. This yields a “reduced” Alexandrov
space A′ ≡ A1 that is weakly homotopically equivalent to A ≡ A0 [53, 78]. Such coarsening
procedure can be applied multiple times: the resulting chain of transformation ofA can be viewed
as a discrete homotopy process, A(0) → A(1) → A(2) → ... → A(n), leading to more and more
“coarse” topologies (Fig. 3).
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The numerical procedure implementing the Alexandrov space reduction is as follows. If a
column mi of a Stong matrix contains only one non-zero element mik, it is removed along with the
corresponding row, then the n× n matrix MA reduces to a (n− 1)× (n− 1) matrix M′A. Eventually,
the Stong matrix reduces to a “core” form that cannot be reduced any further; the corresponding
Alexandrov space CA is referred to as the core of the original Alexandrov spaceA. The reduction
process is illustrated in Suppl. Movies [92].
Proximity between topologies. One can quantify difference between finite topologies Ω1 and
Ω2 by estimating the norm of the difference between the corresponding Stong matrices M1 and
M2, minimized over the set P of all row and column permutations,
DP(M1,M2) = min
P
|P(M1) − M2|. (6)
As a simpler option, one can evaluate the distance between the reduced row echelon forms of the
Stong matrices,
D(M1,M2) = |(rref(M1) − rref(M2)|, (7)
illustrated Fig. 4. Clearly, both distances (6) and (7) vanish if the matrices M1 and M2 are equiva-
lent, i.e., if the corresponding memory spaces are homeomorphic.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MOVIE CAPTIONS
[89] Supplementary Movie 1. Left panel shows navigation along a trajectory γ(t) in physical space with
one hole (Fig. 3A). The corresponding trajectory ℘(t) in memory space is shown on the right panel.
[90] Supplementary Movie 2. Navigation in the memory space (left panel) and the corresponding activity
in the simulated cell assembly network (right panel).
[91] Supplementary Movie 3. Left panel shows navigation in physical space with five holes discussed in
[79] (see Fig. 3C) represented by a trajectory in memory space (right panel).
[92] Supplementary Movie 4-6. Reduction of the memory spaces in the environments shown on Fig. 3.
At each reduction step multiple points are removed simultaneously.
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V. SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES
FIG. S1: Cores of the memory spaces in three environments. (A) The figure demonstrates cores of the memory
spaces obtained for ten different place field maps in the three environments shown on Fig. 3. The shapes of the
cores depend on the map and on the reduction sequence, however they capture the structure of the environment and
approximate its topological core.
